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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1839
___________
QIANG HUANG-LI,
Petitioner
vs.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A98-951-103)
Immigration Judge: Miriam Mills
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 27, 2009
Before: FUENTES, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 15, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Qiang Huang-Li seeks review of a final order of removal. For
the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.
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I.
Huang-Li is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China.
According to Huang-Li, when he lived in China, he did so with family members in a
house that he had inherited from his father. In March 2001, that house and many others
were the subject of a demolition order issued by local government officials. The
government planned to clear the land and reimburse the residents of the demolished
homes. The proposed amount of compensation was objected to as unreasonable by the
residents, including Huang-Li.
In May 2001, government cadres came to his home and threatened HuangLi’s family because of their failure to cooperate with the relocation plan. Two weeks
later, government workers arrived at Huang-Li’s home and forced his family outside so
that demolition could begin. Provoked by the treatment of his mother during this
incident, Huang-Li assaulted one of the workers. He was subsequently arrested and
administratively detained for fifteen days. Huang-Li testified that while in detention he
was interrogated and beaten by government officials. Not long after his release, HuangLi joined about three hundred others in front of a government office building to protest
the demolition. The police were called to disperse the crowd, and, fearing another arrest,
Huang-Li began his flight from China.
Huang-Li entered the United States in September 2005 without being
admitted or paroled by immigration officials. Soon after, he joined the Party for Freedom
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and Democracy in China (“PFDC”), a group in the United States that opposes the Chinese
government. Eventually, Huang-Li was issued a Notice to Appear, charging him with
removability based on his unlawful entry. He conceded removability and requested relief
in the form of asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
Against Torture. He claimed that if returned to China, he would be jailed for his
opposition to the demolition of his house, and also for his political activities with PFDC
in the United States.
After a hearing, the immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Huang-Li removed,
finding that his account of pertinent events lacked credibility and sufficient proof. The
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed without opinion. Huang-Li then filed
this timely petition for review, asserting three issues for adjudication: 1) “Is Mr. HuangLi’s case a mixed motive case in which he showed that his political opinion was a central
reason for his arrest and torture?”; 2) “Is the BIA approach to mixed motive cases as
enunciated by Matter of S-P- . . . still good law in light of the demands of the REAL ID
Act?”; and 3) “Does the record support Mr. Huang-Li’s contention that a mixed motive is
appropriate in his case?”.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1). Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001). However, “[s]ection
1252(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the courts of appeals ‘may
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review a final order of removal only if - (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative
remedies available to the alien as of right.’” Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir.
2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). “[I]ssue exhaustion as required by 1252(d)(1) is a
jurisdictional rule.” Id. at 159 n.3. Thus, an alien must “raise or exhaust his or her
remedies as to each claim or ground for relief [before the BIA] if he or she is to preserve
the right of judicial review of that claim.” Id. at 159.
On appeal before the BIA, Huang-Li challenged the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination, and argued that he had “carried the burden of proof in his claim that he
was arrested in China for political reasons and that the Judge read the INA too narrowly.”
(A.R. 9, 11.) Notably, Huang-Li did not present any claims concerning “mixed-motive”
persecution in his brief or in his notice of appeal to the BIA. Therefore, the only claims
ripe for our review concern Huang-Li’s challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination and his allegations of past and prospective persecution on account of both
his opposition to the demolition of his house in China and his membership in PFDC.
III.
When the BIA issues an affirmance without opinion, “we review the IJ’s
opinion and scrutinize its reasoning.” See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc). We review both the IJ’s factual findings and her adverse credibility
determination for substantial evidence. See Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226,
228 (3d Cir. 2007); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). The IJ’s adverse
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credibility determination will not be disturbed unless “any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Dia, 353 F.3d at 249. Furthermore, because
Huang-Li filed his asylum application after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, the
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods upon which the IJ’s adverse credibility
finding is based need not go the heart of his claim. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114,
119 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).

The IJ based her adverse credibility determination on several
factors, not least of which were Huang-Li’s failure to reasonably corroborate his
claims that he was beaten while in detention and that his membership in PFDC
would cause the Chinese government to detain or persecute him if he returns to
China. In particular, Huang-Li provided no documentation of medical
treatment, claiming that there was nothing to show because his injuries were
“internal”; nor did his mother’s letter make any mention that he was beaten
while detained. The IJ also noted that PFDC is not referenced in any of the
relevant Country Reports, and that Huang-Li failed to provide any other
reasonable corroboration to demonstrate that PFDC is an organization
recognized by China or that China targets members of that organization.
Moreover, the IJ found an inconsistency in Huang-Li’s testimony as to when he
had received a document from the Public Security Bureau regarding his
detention. In light of all these inconsistencies and failures to provide
5

corroborating proof, the IJ found Huang-Li to be incredible.
It is not enough that we might have found Huang-Li credible if we were
hearing his testimony in the first instance. Adverse credibility findings must be afforded
substantial deference, so long as they are supported by sufficient, cogent reasons. See
Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2005). We are convinced that such reasons
exist here. Therefore, we cannot say that “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude” that Huang-Li was a credible witness at his hearing. Dia, 353
F.3d at 249.1
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

1

Even assuming, arguendo, that Huang-Li could overcome the adverse credibility
determination, he would not be entitled to relief. When asked by his attorney on direct
examination, “[w]hat harm do you fear,” Huang-Li responded as follows: “Just probably I
would be put in jail.” (A.R. 85.) A fear of prosecution may constitute grounds for asylum
if the prosecution is motivated by one of the five enumerated factors, “and if the
punishment under the law is sufficiently serious to constitute persecution.” Shardar v.
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, neither condition is supported by the
record.
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